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4Abstract
This research paper analyzes the efforts of the past decade to turn the UN peace opera-
tions apparatus into a learning organization. It begins by examining a traditional organiza-
tional culture of peacekeeping, which is the subject of section 2 of this paper. The traditio-
nal culture emerged under the conditions of Cold War peacekeeping operations. It prized 
maximum political flexibility over professional management practices. After the shock of 
the UN’s catastrophic failures in the face of genocide in Rwanda and Srebrenica, this tradi-
tional culture came to be challenged by a new generation of peace operations officials. 
This group of “reformers” promoted objectives such as critical reflection and organizational 
learning while the “traditionalists” sought to protect the organization from excessive bu-
reaucratic standardization.  
Section 3 details the structural and political constraints to learning that the reform agenda 
had to deal with in the beginning. The peace operations bureaucracy is a fragile, extremely 
decentralized and highly politicized organization – and none of these traits have served to 
promote its capacity to institutionalize learning. Perhaps most importantly, the fact that all 
but a few civilian staff can only ever receive short-term contracts and have had, in 2009, 
less than two years of experience in peace operations underscores the adverse career 
incentives and limited cause to identify strongly with the organization that individuals have.  
Together with the cultural rift that had begun to emerge in the late 1990s, these structural 
and political constraints provided the backdrop for the reform efforts that began in 2000 
with the so-called Brahimi report, driven by the new generation of managers who gradually 
came into influential headquarters jobs from the field. Their initial efforts are outlined in 
section 4, which draws on examples from several in-depth case studies on specific at-
tempts at learning particular lessons in various subject areas of peace operations. After 
several years of focusing on the nuts and bolts of managing growth, the learning agenda 
took shape in 2005 as part of “Peace Operations 2010,” Under-Secretary-General Jean-
Marie Guéhenno’s central professionalization initiative. 
Section 5 depicts the “Peace Operations 2010” agenda that put learning at the center of 
reform efforts, again with illustrations from our in-depth case studies on the impact of those 
efforts (published in full detail elsewhere). Two of the key elements of Peace Operations 
2010 were a top-down guidance development effort and a bottom-up knowledge sharing 
toolbox, the products of which could be used as a source of feedback to inform the formu-
lation and improvement of guidance for as long as it would take to establish an effective 
evaluation capacity as well. Training and evaluation, however, did not receive the same 
level of attention and political/financial support from member states. As a result, even the 
lessons that were taken up by the organization, debated, refined and formally adopted of-
ten languished for lack of effective institutionalization in practice. 
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Zusammenfassung
Das Forschungspapier untersucht die Bemühungen der letzten 10 Jahre, den UN-Apparat 
für Friedenseinsätze in eine “lernende Organisation” zu verwandeln. Als Ausgangspunkt 
für diesen Prozess analysiert Kapitel 2 die traditionelle Organisationskultur der VN-
Friedenseinsätze. Unter den Bedingungen der Friedenssicherung während des Kalten 
Krieges entstand eine Organisationskultur, die ein Maximum politischer Flexibilität auch 
auf Kosten der Professionalisierung von Führung und Verwaltung zu sichern suchte. Als 
eine Folge des katastrophalen Versagens der VN gegenüber dem Völkermord in Ruanda 
und Srebenica begann eine jüngere Generation von Mitarbeitern, diese traditionelle Kultur 
herauszufordern. Diese „Reformer“ wollen Ziele wie Selbstkritik und Organisationslernen 
stärker verankern, während die „Traditionalisten“ versuchten, die Organisation vor über-
mäßiger bürokratischer Standardisierung zu schützen. 
Kapitel 3 zeigt die strukturellen und politischen Grenzen auf, der die Reforminitiative im 
Hinblick auf die institutionelle Lernfähigkeit der VN-Friedenssicherungsbürokratie gegen-
über stand. Die VN-Friedenssicherungsbürokratie ist eine fragile, extrem dezentralisierte 
und höchst politisierte Organisation – und keine dieser Eigenschaften war hilfreich bei der 
Entwicklung ihrer Lernfähigkeit. Die Tatsache dass zivile Mitarbeiter nur auf Kurzzeitbasis 
angestellt werden und z.B. 2009 im Schnitt weniger als zwei Jahre Erfahrung in Friedens-
einsätzen hatten unterstreicht die problematischen Anreizstrukturen und die mangelnden 
Grundlagen zur dauerhaften Identifikation des Einzelnen mit der Organisation. 
Der kulturelle Konflikt seit Ende der 1990er Jahre und diese strukturellen und politischen 
Hindernisse bildeten den Kontext für die Reforminitiative der 2000er Jahre. Diese begann 
mit dem sog. Brahimi-Bericht 2000 und wurde von hauptsächlich jüngeren Mitarbeitern 
vorangetrieben, die aus dem Feld in einflussreiche Positionen im Hauptquartier gelangten. 
Ihre ersten Schritte werden in Kapitel 4 skizziert, mit Beispielen aus einigen detaillierten 
Fallstudien über konkrete Lernprozesse. Für die ersten Jahre stand die Bewältigung des 
enormen Wachstums der Friedenseinsätze im Vordergrund. Erst 2005 begann die Lerna-
genda als Teil von „Peace Operations 2010“, der Professionalisierungsinitiative von Unter-
generalsekretär Jean-Marie Guéhenno, Form anzunehmen. 
Kapitel 5 beschreibt die Initiative „Peace Operations 2010“, die das Thema Lernen in den 
Mittelpunkt stellte. Dazu dienen wieder Beispiele aus unseren Fallstudien (die in vollem 
Umfang an anderem Ort veröffentlicht wurden). Zwei der Kernelemente der Initiative waren 
die Einführung zentralisierter Doktrinentwicklung und dezentralisierten Wissensaustauschs 
durch eine Reihe von Instrumenten, deren Ergebnisse auch als Feedbackmechanismus für 
Doktrinentwicklung bis zur Entwicklung effektiver Evaluierungsprozesse dienen konnten. 
Ausbildung und Evaluierung gerieten dabei ins Hintertreffen, sowohl intern als auch von 
seiten der politischen und finanziellen Aufmerksamkeit der Mitgliedsstaaten. Daher wurden 
auch die Lehren, die die Organisation aufnahm, diskutierte, verbesserte und letztlich an-
nahm, in der Praxis nicht umgesetzt. 
61. Introduction 
Peace operations conducted by the United Nations have grown tremendously over the 
past decade. Fielding more than 120,000 soldiers, police officers and civilian officials in 
about 15 missions across the globe, peacekeepers and peacebuilders under the blue flag 
operate on a scale that is second only to the United States military in terms of worldwide 
deployment. The UN peace operations apparatus is also a fragile, decentralized and highly 
politicized bureaucracy, where fluid field operations are managed by comparatively small 
headquarters in New York. At the center of this “peace operations bureaucracy” are the 
twin Departments of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and Field Support (DFS) in the UN 
Secretariat.1 Unlike many bureaucracies, the peace operations apparatus has little control 
over the careers of most of its members, including the most senior managers of its far-
flung operations in hotspots around the world. At the same time, the UN Secretariat is a 
bureaucracy that is regularly being criticized as excessively slow, inefficient and inflexible. 
To examine organizational learning in this context may seem to hold very little promise 
except to provide ample evidence of bureaucratic obstacles and political sabotage. These 
expectations are only partially confirmed by our in-depth study of twelve organizational 
learning processes over the past decade.2 In fact, we find that the institutional context that 
enables or constrains opportunities for organizational learning has evolved considerably. In 
1999, when the UN first deployed its missions to Kosovo and East Timor with mandates to 
set up transitional administrations that were unprecedented in their scope and ambition, its 
staff had nowhere to turn for guidance. From Sergio Vieira de Mello, the first head of mis-
sion in Kosovo, to the junior officials tasked with setting up political institutions, running 
elections or reintegrating militia members into civilian life, thousands of often ad-hoc hires 
were faced with gargantuan tasks and given little in the way of doctrine to turn to. In con-
trast, today’s UN peacebuilders have at least a small but growing library of fundamental 
doctrine, hands-on guidance and analytical summaries of previous experience. They are 
invited to exchange ideas in on-line communities of practice with their peers in other mis-
sions. Mid-level managers in the field have the opportunity to meet their peers at occa-
sional workshops and provide feedback to doctrine and guidance developers at headquar-
ters.
This is the result of the evolution the infrastructure for learning in the UN peace operations 
bureaucracy that this paper traces over the past decade. Following the failure to institu-
tionalize learning support in the 1990s,3 the Brahimi Report sparked a comprehensive re-
form effort within the Secretariat with the goal of building an effective learning infrastructure 
and, ultimately, transforming the peace operations apparatus into a learning organization. 
In March 2000, when Secretary-General Kofi Annan commissioned the former Algerian 
                                                  
1  Before 2008, the peace operations bureaucracy was managed by DPKO. DPKO was then split into two departments, 
with the administrative and support part of the department being spun of as the new Department of Field Support 
(DFS). DFS remains in many ways integrated with DPKO’s operations, however. The “peace operations bureaucracy” 
is a fragmented organization that consists of the field missions themselves as well as various departments and agen-
cies involved in strategic and support roles. The core of the peace operations bureaucracy is the Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in the UN Secretariat. The department assists the Secretary-General and the in-
tergovernmental bodies such as the Security Council, the General Assembly and their various committees and work-
ing groups in their policy-making roles. DPKO is also the key bureaucratic actor (and some areas the only one) to 
plan, equip, deploy, supply and control each of the 15-18 peace operations deployed globally at any one time during 
this decade. At the same time, many of the tasks of modern peace operations require the collaboration with many 
other departments and agencies within the UN system and beyond, and the need to coordinate with these actors has 
been an increasingly critical task for DPKO. 
2  We report the results of this larger study of organizational learning in the UN peace operations bureaucracy in 
Benner, Mergenthaler and Rotmann (2011). 
3  Howard (2008), Benner and Rotmann (2008). 
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foreign minister and long-time UN diplomat Lakhdar Brahimi to chair a panel on UN peace 
operations, he sought to address the huge challenges that the organization faced as it 
emerged from the major crises of the previous years. Three major trends defined the con-
text for UN peace operations for which the organization was not adequately prepared. 
First, the renewed willingness of world powers to deploy blue helmets threatened to over-
whelm the political leadership, management and support capacity of the Secretariat. Se-
cond, the organization began to react to the dilemmas posed by its traditional principle of 
“non-use of force except in self-defense” by reconsidering its doctrine and rules of en-
gagement. Third, UN peace operations were increasingly tasked to build or rebuild institu-
tions – a task much more fraught with political and practical pitfalls than the traditional mili-
tary-diplomatic role that blue helmets had served over many decades.4
Taken together, the trends of rapid growth, changing notions on the use of force and the 
new task of institution-building defined the learning challenge for peace operations in the 
21st century. Having to face all these challenges at the same time had a contradictory ef-
fect on the Secretariat. On the one hand, the three-fold pressures provided ample evi-
dence of the need for building a professional organization with a strong learning infrastruc-
ture to match these challenges. On the other hand, they also brought many urgent opera-
tional priorities with them that laid claims on resources, time and attention to the detriment 
of longer-term institutional investments. 
It was against this backdrop that Secretary-General Kofi Annan commissioned the Brahimi 
Report. Its analysis and the political reform process that it sparked aimed to professional-
ize peace operations in order to meet the new challenges. The panelists minced no words 
when calling the UN to task for their failure to effectively support learning: “lessons learned 
in Headquarters practice are not routinely captured, (…) comprehensive training pro-
grammes for new arrivals are non-existent and (…) user-friendly manuals and standard 
operating procedures remain half-complete.”5 While “all are agreed on the need to exploit 
cumulating field experience … not enough has been done to improve the system’s ability 
to tap that experience or to feed it back into the development of operational doctrine, plans, 
procedures or mandates.”6
These assessments, like many others throughout the report, were unusually candid by UN 
standards. Because the document had the backing of an eminent panel and chairman as 
well as the strong support of the Secretary-General himself and of key Security Council 
members, it provided a rare political opening for the Secretariat to push for far-reaching 
change. Reformers within the peace operations community, led by Jean-Marie Guéhenno, 
the incoming head of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, gathered under the 
banner of the Brahimi Report and made its analysis and the spirit of its recommendations 
their guiding paradigm.  
The daunting challenges borne out of the rapid growth of peace operations, their increas-
ingly frequent deployment into complex civil wars and the growing need for peacebuilding 
had already cast their shadows in the various crises of 1999/2000, when the UN had 
struggled to man and equip four new missions on three continents, to reinforce the strug-
gling operation in Sierra Leone against the repeated challenges from armed spoilers, and 
to provide political and practical guidance for the many new tasks that the Security Council 
had given to the new transitional administration missions in Kosovo and East Timor. The 
capacity of the system to withstand these pressures had again become overtaxed. As a 
result, the reformers were convinced that another disaster on the scale of Rwanda or Sre-
                                                  
4  For a more detailed explanation of these three defining trends, see Benner, Mergenthaler and Rotmann (2011: 14-
26).
5  United Nations (2000: 37). 
6  United Nations (2000: 39). 
8brenica was only a matter of time if the UN would keep doing business as usual. The only 
way to avoid this fate was to finally undertake substantive reforms in terms of doctrine, 
funding, management and culture. The establishment of an effective learning infrastructure 
was at the heart of this reform agenda that grew out of the Brahimi Report, was champi-
oned by Guéhenno and driven by a cohort of younger managers whose formative experi-
ence of peacekeeping had been in the field during the existential crises of the 1990s. Their 
efforts faced significant obstacles in both the cultural and the structural DNA of the organi-
zation. Implementing reforms to promote learning was a fundamental political challenge – it 
meant going against and changing some of the core tenets of the entrenched organizational 
culture of the UN peace operations apparatus. Indeed, for the Brahimi Report and the dec-
ade-long effort that was launched under its name, overcoming these internal obstacles was a 
goal in its own right, in addition to rallying member states in support of an increased budget 
and more responsible Security Council mandates.7
This study is part of a broader research project on organizational learning in the UN peace 
operations bureaucracy in the decade after the Brahimi report. The present paper focuses on 
the “macro story” of institutional evolution, drawing only occasionally on the findings of our in-
depth case studies of individual attempts to learn in field mission and on particular practical 
challenges. The full case studies are part of a recently published book.8 Building on the litera-
ture surrounding international organizations, organizational learning and peace operations, 
our research makes a contribution to opening up the black box of international organizations 
as bureaucracies. The definition of organizational learning at the center of our study is based 
on the premises that (a) learning at the group level is possible as a social process distinct 
from (but dependent on) individual learning, and that (b) the analysis of learning does not 
require the analyst to make a normative judgment about the accuracy or value of each les-
son. Drawing on the management literature and linking it back to some of the classics from 
Max Weber to the debate on bureaucracies in the 1960s, we take key insights on the nature 
of bureaucracies from the classical sociology of organizations (such as, for example, the sa-
lience of rules) with the seminal work of Ernst Haas on learning in international organizations 
(directing our attention to the importance of knowledge). Combining the emphasis on rules 
and knowledge, we define organizational learning as a knowledge-based process of ques-
tioning and changing organizational rules to change organizational practice. To analyze the 
process dimension of learning, we use the common heuristic of a policy cycle. We consider a 
learning process successful only if the full cycle of knowledge acquisition at the level of a 
small group proposing a lesson, advocacy toward the lesson’s formal adoption by the organi-
zation and institutionalization not just into formal doctrine but into practice is completed.9
The starting point for understanding the evolution of the peace operations bureaucracy in 
terms of its institutional learning capacity lies in the traditional organizational culture of 
peacekeeping, which is the subject of section 2 of this paper. We identify a “traditional” inter-
pretive frame that came in conflict with a “reformist” frame as a new cohort of peace opera-
tions officials began to put the Brahimi agenda into practice. Section 3 details the structural 
and political constraints to learning that the professionalization agenda had to deal with in the 
beginning (as outlined in section 4, which draws on examples from our in-depth case stud-
ies). Section 5 depicts the “Peace Operations 2010” agenda that put learning at the center of 
reform efforts, again with illustrations from the larger case studies on the impact of those ef-
forts. Section 6 concludes the paper and offers policy recommendations. 
                                                  
7  Ahmed, Keating and Solinas (2007), Durch (2004).  
8  Benner, Mergenthaler and Rotmann (2011). 
9  For a detailed introduction to our theoretical and analytical approach, see Benner, Mergenthaler and Rotmann (2011: 
7-10, 51-65). 
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2. The traditional organizational culture of UN peace-
keeping and the reformist challenge 
The Brahimi reform agenda challenged the core of the entrenched organizational culture of 
peacekeeping that had developed over a half century of institutional history. It is based on 
a traditionalist interpretative frame that views UN peace operations as a feeble endeavor 
deprived of necessary resources and political support to implement its mandate with any 
degree of professionalism. As a result, peacekeepers saw themselves forced to operate in 
a climate of constant crisis in which they had “always been very good at taking experience 
and knowledge and expanding it into another field, learning to do things on the fly.”10 On
the flip side of the same coin, critical introspection and any kind of standard operating pro-
cedures became to be seen as a threat rather than an opportunity to improve the effective-
ness of their work. Maintaining whatever precious political room for maneuver had been 
left by member states was the highest priority, and self-criticism (which could be used as 
ammunition by outside detractors of the UN) and standard procedures (which may limit 
senior officials’ leeway to take decisions as required) were a threat. Based on such a 
frame, the organization produced cultural norms that prized political flexibility or, in the 
words of one long-time senior official, “constructive ambiguity” and disregarded efforts to 
openly discuss previous failures in order to draw lessons or develop standardized doctrine 
to mainstream such lessons into future practice.11
The roots of the traditional culture of peacekeeping reach back to the early days of the 
United Nations. In May 1948, when the Security Council asked the Secretariat to set up the 
very first peacekeeping operation, the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) for 
Palestine, there was neither precedent nor experience on how to put the idea of a neutral 
UN presence in a war-torn area into practice. The task of planning its deployment, defining 
a doctrine, recruiting staff, finding accommodation and office space, establishing a radio 
network and a myriad of other vital issues fell on the American UN official Ralph Bunche, 
then the principal aide to the UN mediator for Palestine, Count Folke Bernadotte of Swe-
den. With a tiny staff of his own, Bunche put together the practical foundations of the mis-
sion while the actual observers, drawn from a carefully balanced mix of nations, were slow-
ly arriving throughout the summer.12
Eight years later, when the UN fielded its first armed peacekeeping force in response to 
the Suez crisis, Bunche had become one of two Under-Secretaries-General for Special 
Political Affairs in the Secretary-General’s office in New York. His special assistant at the 
time, Brian Urquhart, was the only staff member who had any military experience, and was 
therefore put in charge of the hastily assembled working group to set up the UN Emergen-
cy Force (UNEF). In his words, the ad-hoc culture of UN peacekeeping in the 1950s comes 
vividly to life:  
The process of setting up UNEF took place in Bunche’s conference room on the 
thirty-eighth floor and proceeded more or less around the clock as the situation 
demanded. (…) Innumerable problems, great and small, had to be resolved ur-
gently, mostly by improvisation. (…) The problem of uniforms and identification 
was quite literally vital, since some of the UN troops wore British-style uniforms 
[with Britain a party to the conflict]. What was needed was distinctive headgear for 
a distant sniper to recognize. A UN-blue beret seemed to be the answer, but it 
                                                  
10  Interview with a long-standing senior DPKO official, 2009. 
11   Interview with another long-standing senior DPKO official, 2009. 
12  Urquhart (1998 [1993]: 161). 
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was impossible to procure enough berets in time. American plastic helmet-liners, 
however, were available in quantity in Europe, and were ready, spray-painted UN 
blue, in time for the first UNEF detachments to wear on their entry into Egypt. 
Identity cards in four languages had to be formulated (…). Tent stoves were an-
other problem (…). The nights and days passed quickly in dealing with a hundred 
similar details.13
As UNEF settled down into a more orderly routine within a year and a half, UN Secretary-
General Dag Hammarskjöld ordered an eight-months project, immense in light of the few 
resources available, to put together a “manual,” in Hammarskjöld’s words, to “provide fun-
damental guidance for any future plans or efforts relating to a United Nations force.”14 In
the years to come, however, setting up each new operation would be the same political, 
operational, logistical, and force generation scramble all over again. Urquhart’s description 
of ONUC, the vast and tragic operation in the Congo established in 1960, captures best 
the dilemma that came to define the organizational culture of peacekeeping for over half a 
century:
There were seldom any simple answers even to the smallest problems. Later on, 
some critics derided our efforts as amateurish or disorganized, but neither rules, 
nor precedents nor organization existed for a situation like the Congo in 1960. Un-
der Bunche’s leadership ONUC had, for the most part, to improvise as it went 
along. Bunche’s insistence on personally controlling and checking all the activities 
of ONUC was also criticized later. To those of us on the spot this seemed the only 
sensible way of managing a vast emergency enterprise put together in a hurry, 
where many of the staff were new and untried, and where a single mistake could, 
and often did, have massive repercussions.15
The political and organizational pressures of the early years therefore created a culture of 
ad-hoc decision-making in a climate of constant crisis. Staff and resources were scarce, 
and the political wiggle room between the crushing might of the great powers was in most 
instances very small. As a result, the operating style of the “founding fathers” of peace-
keeping exemplified and prized a reliance on personal relationships instead of formal, de-
personalized reporting chains, case-by-case considerations instead of general templates 
and preserving “constructive ambiguity” whenever instructions, mandates or budgetary 
regulations were put on paper, in order to maximize whatever political room for maneuver 
remained available to the UN.
Over time, the frame of a crisis-driven mode of operation solidified and formed the core of 
the organizational culture of peacekeeping. At headquarters, the tiny staff in the Office of 
Special Political Affairs had its plate full with the whole peace and security portfolio, includ-
ing preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping. Other departments provided 
the necessary administrative and logistical support for field operations. Upon Bunche’s 
death in 1971, Urquhart succeeded him in the post of Under-Secretary-General for Special 
Political Affairs in charge of peace and security. When Urquhart retired in 1985, the British 
diplomat Marrack Goulding became the first peacekeeping chief who had not been among 
the founders of the UN Secretariat in 1945. Goulding inherited a political team of seven 
and an even smaller military staff – effectively, an office no different in size and structure 
                                                  
13  Urquhart (1998 [1993]: 268-269). 
14  Dag Hammarsköld, quoted in Urquhart (1998 [1993]: 289). 
15  Urquhart (1998 [1993]: 319-320). 
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than the one with which Ralph Bunche and Brian Urquhart had set up the first peacekeep-
ing operation 37 years before.16
With the end of the Cold War, UN peacekeeping saw a sudden surge in demand. Between 
1989 and 1991, the Security Council mandated eight new peace operations, among them 
two large and unprecedentedly ambitious missions to oversee Namibia’s transition to inde-
pendence and to implement a settlement to the civil war in Cambodia. In February 1992, 
the new Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali established the Department of Peace-
keeping Operations (DPKO), initially with Goulding in charge. Hundreds of new temporary 
posts were created in various Secretariat departments to help carry the rapidly increased 
burden of supporting peace operations. To fill the few dozen additional political and leader-
ship posts in the new department, the UN drew on a mixture of civilians (mostly diplomats) 
seconded by their governments, retired military officers and regular Secretariat staff. Some 
of these officials were just returning from field assignments in Namibia or Cambodia, while 
many others came straight from their capital or their most recent diplomatic assignment 
with little experience in peacekeeping. Many in this generation went on to play major roles 
in the UN throughout the 1990s and beyond, including Iqbal Riza, later to become Kofi An-
nan’s Chief of Staff, Shashi Tharoor, Under-Secretary-General for Communications and 
Public Information and a one-time contender to succeed Kofi Annan as UN Secretary-
General, Hédi Annabi, the second-in-command at DPKO between 1997-2007 who was 
often called “DPKO’s living institutional memory” and who tragically died in the earthquake 
on 12 January 2010 in Haiti, and Dmitry Titov, who defused many crises as director of the 
Africa division in Annabi’s Office of Operations and took over the new rule of law office in 
2007.
Thrown into the furious pace of the peace operations machinery, struggling to raise troops 
and staff to feed another fivefold increase in uniformed peacekeepers and the twofold in-
crease in missions in a twelve-month period between 1992 and 1993, the newcomers easi-
ly absorbed and reproduced the organizational culture of constant improvisation that the 
“founding fathers” of peacekeeping had created so many years before. In fact, they had 
little choice in the matter: because of the persistent refusal of member states to fund a 
more robust headquarters capacity to direct and support the slowly growing list of peace 
operations, there were no resources to develop a more professional organization to under-
take conflict analysis for the support of strategic planning and crisis decision-making.17 As
a result, the culture of improvisation, muddling-through and management of the moment 
was in many ways a logical consequence of the external constraints placed upon the 
peace operations bureaucracy. It was not perfect, however, even by the standards of its 
own proponents. Luiz Carlos da Costa, another long-time senior official who also died in 
the 2010 Haiti earthquake, argued in an interview in 2009 that in retrospect, DPKO’s ex-
cessive cultural self-confidence made it also miss many opportunities to partner with other 
organizations before institutional rivalries could erupt. Nonetheless, the traditional culture 
of peacekeeping clearly worked in holding the place together through a series of crises 
throughout the Cold War, as long as the number and scope of missions were limited.  
With the number and scope of operations rapidly increasing after the end of the Cold War, 
the drawbacks of this organizational culture that resisted building a professional and self-
critical organization slowly became apparent. In March 1993, when Kofi Annan took over 
the peacekeeping department, DPKO “still operated in an atmosphere of chaos,” as one of 
Annan’s biographers observed.18 About 50 staffers directed and supported operations 
comprising 80,000 blue helmets across the globe with the assistance of little more than a 
                                                  
16  Goulding (2002: 27-28). 
17  Kühne (1999), Malone and Thakur (2001). 
18  Meisler (2007: 67). 
12
hundred logisticians and administrators dealing with finance and personnel. In the first 
eighteen months of Annan’s tenure, DPKO grew to about 400 staff including the merger 
with the unit that covered finance, personnel and logistics support as well as large num-
bers of temporary hires and loaned personnel from various governments. However, follow-
ing the withdrawal of American troops from Somalia and the disillusionment with UN 
peacekeeping in the U.S. Congress, the sensible build-up of organizational capacity sud-
denly stopped. Despite the continuously rising operational demands placed on the organi-
zation by the Security Council, particularly in the Balkans, the financial masters of the UN 
failed to invest in its organizational capacity to deliver. 
This left Annan little budgetary room for maneuver to implement his ambitious agenda. As 
a first step toward professionalizing the peace operations apparatus, he created a situation 
center to keep in touch around the clock with increasingly risky situations on the ground.19
Beginning in 1993, the senior leadership of DPKO also began to establish the organiza-
tion’s first Lessons Learned Unit. Despite strong support from internal oversight bodies, 
troop-contributing countries and the General Assembly at large, it took Annan until April 
1995 to create a unit of two: a head of unit and one research assistant.20 Under the prevail-
ing organizational culture at DPKO, the approach to learning and introspection remained 
fundamentally defensive. For senior officials, who prized political flexibility and ad-hoc im-
provisation above all and who were reflexively opposed to standard operating procedures 
on substantive matters of policy implementation, the absolute need to maintain internal 
coherence and “constructive ambiguity” for the future severely constrained the effective-
ness of “learning lessons.” Learning was confined to the level of individuals and small 
groups behind closed doors, where it became a luxury that often took second place after 
the demands of constant crisis management.  
Like in many tight-knit social systems put under persistent pressure, the constant percep-
tion of urgency and crisis fostered defensiveness against outside “interference” and inter-
nal deviance or criticism, promoted groupthink and stymied open discussion and learning.21
In one telling example, Jarat Chopra, a young participant to a series of conferences held in 
1995 to review the earlier UN operations in Somalia recalls:  
Hard lessons cannot be learned politely, yet the same diplomatic approach that 
failed to respond to the social and political environment in Somalia failed to yield 
lessons at the meetings. (…) [Even] limited proposals were marginalized. If 
knowledge is power, in the U.N. knowledge is dangerous and officials [are] secre-
tive, which is organizationally suicidal. By far the majority of ‘lessons’ were banal 
conclusions that have been known for decades, such as the need for clearer 
mandates and more resources. Despite calls for frank discussions, a diplomatic 
environment prevented cool analysis; what is acceptable to say may not be useful 
to know. Self-criticism in sessions was transformed formally into self-justification 
as a whole.22
Chopra’s observations are just one illustration of the general reaction of the traditionalists 
when the majority of world opinion turned against the UN following its failure to mobilize 
and lead an effective response to the genocides in Rwanda in 1994 and in Srebrenica in 
1995. Most of the more senior officials defended themselves and the institution by pointing 
to the responsibility of member state governments: “the responsibility lay with member 
                                                  
19  Meisler (2007: 71). 
20  We have explained the genesis and effective paralysis of DPKO’s Lessons Learned Unit in the 1990s at greater 
length in Benner and Rotmann (2008: 45-46). 
21  Hermann (1963), Janowitz (1959). 
22  Chopra (1995). 
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states, but the blame fell on the Secretariat,” as one former senior DPKO official argued in 
an interview in May 2009.  
The consequences were drastic: the “lull” in peace operations between 1995 and 1998 
resulted in huge financial pressure on DPKO, which lost 27% of its professional staff. But 
in the view of these senior officials, the UN as an organization had worked as well as could 
be expected under the circumstances. It was the member states that had created the cir-
cumstances, in particular those dominating the Security Council and holding the purse 
strings. They had deprived the organization of credibility and resources by withdrawing 
their blue helmets at the first sign of trouble in Rwanda and limiting their rules of engage-
ment to fit an unrealistic fantasy of peacekeeping while organized, premeditated violence 
was unfolding. Ultimately, in this view, member states had failed the UN and their own lofty 
pronouncements of “humanitarian intervention” when they had sent lightly armed and de-
fensively mandated peacekeepers into a war zone in the first place. In comparison to such 
grave political and ethical failings on the part of politicians in world capitals, whatever might 
have gone wrong within the UN bureaucracy was hardly more than a glitch. 
The Reformist Challenge to Organizational Culture 
In the mid-1990s, a new generation of civilian managers joined the peace operations 
community. Spending their formative years with the United Nations on the ground, mainly 
in the large missions in the Balkans, many of these younger officials experienced the tradi-
tional organizational culture of peace operations as dysfunctional and dangerous. Watch-
ing the crises of Rwanda and Srebrenica unfold, they took issue with the instinctively de-
fensive response of their superiors in the field and the peacekeeping establishment in New 
York. From their perspective, as accurate and necessary as it was to criticize key member 
state governments, the UN as an organization should not be allowed to hide behind diplo-
mats and policy-makers in Western capitals to avoid critical introspection. Aside from the 
failures of high politics and the personal responsibility of senior decision-makers, they 
found the organizational culture of peace operations at fault as well. In their view, the cul-
ture that had emerged from forty years of directing and supporting traditional peacekeeping 
during the Cold War was inadequate for the scale and scope of modern peace operations. 
In the different context of robust peacekeeping or peace enforcement in complex civil wars, 
these shortcomings of analysis, information-sharing, excessively cautious decision-making 
and anticipatory obedience to member states that were rooted in the traditional culture had 
contributed to the UN’s share of failures in Rwanda and Srebrenica. 
As a result of widespread internal dissent along these lines, a split emerged in the hitherto 
monolithic organizational culture of peacekeeping. A new, competing interpretative frame 
held the traditional culture partly responsible for the political and managerial shortcomings 
in responding to the situations in Rwanda and Srebrenica. From this perspective, a more 
professional culture based on open self-assessments, common standards and organiza-
tional learning would be required to avoid the repetition of these failures in the future. 
This clash of interpretations first played out over the suggestion of an internal inquiry into 
the UN’s actions during the crises. In 1996, the Jordanian diplomat Prince Zeid Ra’ad Zeid 
al-Hussein became the Deputy Permanent Representative of his country to the United Na-
tions in New York. He had spent the preceding years as a Political Officer with the UN Pro-
tection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia, where he had been deeply affected by the events 
in Srebrenica. When he floated the idea to conduct a thorough investigation to be conduct-
ed by the Secretariat itself, senior officials in DPKO reacted defensively. “The Secretariat 
had no wish to expose its dirty laundry,” as a close observer of the UN in the Annan years 
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described it.23 Using his newly acquired leverage on the diplomatic stage, Zeid rallied the 
ambassadors of Bosnia and Croatia to create public pressure on the Secretariat until the 
General Assembly commissioned “a comprehensive report, including an assessment” of 
the UN’s reaction to the events in Bosnia.24
Annan agreed to conduct an unusually candid investigation that would not shy away from 
institutional self-criticism and asked his Chief of Staff, Iqbal Riza, to supervise the process. 
Riza delegated the research and writing of the report to two young political officers who 
had served in the Balkans, David Harland and Salman Ahmed. Riza, Harland and Ahmed 
all supported the need to expose the failures as a means to create pressure for organiza-
tional change. Therefore, Harland and Ahmed conducted a detailed investigation over six 
months and wrote a report that, while “unsparing on the member states who shaped the 
policy,” was “no less harsh on the UN professionals who carried it out.”25 Cast in the voice 
of the Secretary-General himself, the report minced no words in its conclusion: “Through 
error, misjudgment and an inability to recognize the scope of evil confronting us, we failed 
to do our part to help save the people of Srebrenica from the Serb campaign of mass mur-
der.”26 By not using military force to stop the impending violence against Bosnian Muslim 
civilians in Srebrenica, the report blamed “the management of UNPROFOR” for failing to 
“adapt mandates to the reality on the ground,”27 a lapse that was, in Traub’s words, “a mat-
ter less of shortsightedness than of institutional culture and entrenched principles.”28 Ulti-
mately, “the report suggested that these failures had their origin in the culture and collec-
tive psychology of the Secretariat, which had come to see itself as a bulwark against the 
‘culture of death’ – a phrase used by Boutros-Ghali – that it could not accept the imperative 
to use force.”29
As a direct challenge to the prevailing organizational culture, Harland’s and Ahmed’s draft 
got a frosty reception with DPKO senior management. Many officials “objected, sometimes 
furiously, both to assertions of specific actions and to the report’s broader moral claims 
about the failed doctrine of neutrality.”30 Amid “fierce line-by-line arguments” with senior 
DPKO officials, Riza and Assistant-Secretary-General John Ruggie had to protect the two 
authors “from the wrath of their seniors” to preserve the draft’s candor (ibid.). In the words 
of another close UN observer, the report’s “sheer thoroughness and (…) its readiness to 
present facts in an unvarnished form even though they might be disturbing and uncomfort-
able for the organization (…) rather forced the hand of the UN senior management with 
respect to the question of just how far to go in terms of airing the linens of self-criticism in 
public.”31
The 1999 Srebrenica report marked a turning point in terms of self-criticism. A month later, 
it was followed by the report of an independent panel on the Rwandan genocide that An-
nan had commissioned as well.32 Together with a third report on the failure of the UN sanc-
tions regime against Angola and ultimately the Brahimi Report itself, otherwise critical ob-
servers now found the organization to be “less interested in ducking blame and covering 
itself from attack than it is in improving performance.”33
                                                  
23  Traub (2006: 125). 
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It was by no means assured that this would lead to a lasting and self-sustaining process of 
cultural transformation of the peace operations apparatus. For the time being, however, the 
series of self-critical reports, chiefly that of the Brahimi Panel, provided the new reformist 
generation with considerable momentum. Under the new leadership of Jean-Marie 
Guéhenno, they aimed for nothing less than a wholesale transformation of the organiza-
tion’s culture: only by acknowledging mistakes – at least internally – would the organization 
be able to learn, and only in a more professional bureaucratic culture based on doctrine 
derived from the best available knowledge and constantly evaluated in practice would it be 
able to meet the ambitious expectations for peace operations set in Security Council man-
dates.
However, this transformation toward a learning organization did not come easily and 
proved to be a constant struggle for most of the decade following the publication of the 
Brahimi Report. The gradual shift toward a more professional organizational culture was 
only one part of that struggle. Equally important and even more persistent were the struc-
tural and political constraints, most of them at least partly beyond the control of the Secre-
tariat, that hampered peace operations generally and the evolution of its learning capacity 
in particular. 
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3.  Structural and Political Constraints to Learning 
The longstanding institutional deprivation of peacekeeping combined with the growing 
complexity of post-Cold War missions mandated to combine traditional and “robust” peace 
operations with humanitarian assistance and elements of development cooperation has 
given rise to a number of structural features that often have dysfunctional effects. 
The peace operations bureaucracy is a fragile, extremely decentralized and highly politi-
cized organization. It is fragile in part because of extreme turnover – on average, civilian 
staff stay for less than four years while military and police personnel are generally on 6-12 
month deployments. Weak bonds between the individual and the organization further con-
tribute to this fragility. Soldiers and police officers owe their primary allegiance to their 
home country and naturally view a stint with the United Nations as nothing more than a 
temporary assignment. Civilians, almost all of whom are kept on short-term contracts of a 
year or less, might be more willing to identify with peacekeeping but the insecurity of their 
jobs forces them to always keep looking for another position. As a result, outside a small 
group of career UN officials in New York, the lack of a career structure limits the positive 
incentives the organization can put into place while implicitly penalizing any contribution to 
the common stock of knowledge. After all, from the point of view of an individual, each 
piece of knowledge or experience, if kept private, could be the ticket to their next job. Even 
worse, and beyond the politicization of appointments, the extent of global economic ine-
quality makes it impossible to balance material incentives sufficiently to ensure high com-
petence across the board. 
The peace operations bureaucracy is also highly decentralized, both geographically and 
among different agencies. 99% of its personnel are deployed in the field, and field missions 
enjoy a high degree of political autonomy while being stuck in a regulatory straightjacket in 
matters of administration and procurement. Beyond the sheer geographical distance and 
time difference between New York and most mission areas and the lack of resources at 
headquarters, the way Security Council mandates arise from often difficult diplomatic com-
promises often allows key elements of strategy to be defined only in the vaguest of terms. 
As an unintended consequence, senior officials are required by events to fill the gaps in 
strategic guidance by taking decisions with strategic implications in a piecemeal fashion 
without being authorized and resourced to articulate a strategic plan. As a result, the Spe-
cial Representatives of the Secretary-General (SRSG) heading each mission enjoy wide 
leeway in the most consequential political decisions, as long as they do not violate the 
boundaries set by the great powers. Personal inclinations and personalities often make a 
huge difference in what priorities are pursued, at what pace, and in what kind of relation-
ship to local politicians or other UN agencies. This level of space for individual leadership 
and experimentation creates both opportunities for learning and obstacles for the imple-
mentation of guidance and best practices. 
Internally, however, the senior mission management team has direct authority only over the 
military contingents, police units and civilians assigned to the peace operation as such – and in 
case of military units, only to the extent that the troop contributing countries allow their forces to 
follow UN orders. In addition, member states have found ways to control what many diplomats 
view as an unaccountable bureaucracy by tightening the administrative screws through the 
budget. Responding to their pressure, the organization set up detailed standard operating pro-
cedures regulating equipment purchases, leases on building space, hiring and promotions. 
Taking both effects together, senior officials end up in the perverse position of enjoying ample 
freedom to decide key political questions of strategic importance, but very little choice in many 
of the mundane issues of every-day management. 
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Figure 1: Overstretch: mission demands and headquarters capacity, 1996-2010 
Source: own figure, based on official UN data (UN Department of Public Information, Peacekeeping Back-
ground Sheets and Contributions Sheets). 
Beyond the peacekeeping mission itself, DPKO and the SRSG as the top UN representa-
tive on the ground have no effective authority at all over other UN agencies such as UN-
HCR, WFP, UNDP or the World Bank and their field offices (see Figure 2), despite the fact 
that a modern peace operation cannot implement its mandate without their support. De-
spite many solemn declarations in favor of “coordination” and “integration,” each agency is 
primarily responsible to its own governing and funding body, where a particular political 
setup among member states drives its strategic priorities. To identify and make use of the 
significant overlap among those priorities requires constant inter-agency coordination both 
at headquarters level and in the field. This has particular relevance to day-to-day man-
agement as well as organizational learning with regard to the peacebuilding challenge, 
where almost every UN task or function has to be performed in concert with agencies other 
than DPKO or a peace operation itself. Rarely are peacekeepers the ones with the most 
experience within the UN system on these issues, and in many cases such as the reinte-
gration of former combatants into society, DPKO does not even have the status of a “lead 
agency” and is just one of the players at the table – and certainly not the one with the 
deepest pockets, as soon as the immediate deployment phase is over and development 
agencies and the World Bank have adjusted their programs. 
More recently, an upside has emerged to this fragmentation of responsibilities among the 
UN system as more and more departments and agencies began to develop their own learn-
ing infrastructures, as well. Among the first were UNDP’s Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Re-
covery (even slightly before DPKO), the Secretariat’s Peacebuilding Support Office and the Office 
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). After some initial competition in cases of 
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overlap such as a big study on integrated missions that the humanitarian office had commis-
sioned without DPKO involvement in 2005, the waves have calmed and collaborative learning 
and guidance development became possible when certain conditions were met.34
Figure 2: The Peace Operations Bureaucracy in Context: intergovernmental bodies 
and key organizations at headquarters and field level 
Source: own figure, based on several official UN organizational charts.
Finally, the peace operations bureaucracy is heavily politicized. Member states, particularly the 
powerful permanent members of the Security Council, tend to navigate the bureaucratic maze of 
UN agencies, Secretariat departments and field missions by politicizing senior appointments and 
using their budgetary levers to micromanage managerial decisions. In the 1990s, when the effi-
ciency, effectiveness and accountability of peace operations as a whole became a partisan politi-
cal issue in the United States and a political wedge in North-South politics at the UN as a whole, 
political micromanagement began to extend far beyond the major political questions of each 
agency or mission and deeply into the operational details of implementation. As a result, member 
state diplomats in New York are now spending their time each year critically evaluating every sin-
gle job paid for through the peacekeeping budget, every major equipment purchase, travel ex-
pense or consultant fee. In effect, some of the permanent members of the Security Council are 
using these line-by-line budget negotiations to exert political control over a bureaucracy they re-
gard as insufficiently accountable and unresponsive to their legitimate demands, while non-
members are wielding the red pen to compensate for their lack of influence on the Security 
Council. The result are staggering costs in terms of time and attention on both sides, and a 
tragic loss of flexibility on the part of managers that constrains their ability to enact internal 
organizational reforms, build up an effective learning infrastructure and implement any les-
sons that require institutional changes. 
                                                  
34  For detailed case studies of organizational learning, see Benner, Mergenthaler and Rotmann (2011). 
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4.  The Beginnings of Professionalization 
Together with the emerging cultural rift of the late 1990s, these structural and political con-
straints provided the backdrop for the reform efforts that began in 2000, driven by the new 
generation of managers who gradually came into influential headquarters jobs from the 
field.35 This cohort assembled around the new Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping 
Operations, Jean-Marie Guéhenno. In October 2000, the French scholar-diplomat whose 
career spanned analytical and managerial assignments across the foreign affairs and de-
fense communities was given the daunting task of leading more than a dozen peace oper-
ations around the world while fundamentally rebuilding his headquarters at the same time. 
Guéhenno inherited a department all but overwhelmed with the operational requirements 
of five start-up operations in desperate need of staff, equipment and guidance, one of 
which (UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone, in May 2000) had just suffered an almost fatal crisis. 
Fresh from a series of field visits throughout the summer that had taken him to Sierra Leo-
ne, Bosnia and Kosovo, Guéhenno arrived in New York determined not to leave the long-
er-term challenge of institution-building by the wayside. He was convinced that the chal-
lenges borne out of the rapid growth of peace operations, their increasingly frequent de-
ployment into complex civil wars and the growing need for peacebuilding urgently required 
developing a professional organization for peace operations, even if the incentive structure 
in the Secretariat – being much closer to the diplomatic circuit than to the field – would 
make it hard to remake DPKO into a “good support system” for field operations. The stakes 
were simply too high to repeat the mistake of the mid-1990s, when the failure of Annan’s 
internal reforms had contributed to the catastrophic failures in Rwanda and Srebrenica. At 
the post-Cold War scale of tens of thousands of troops, police and civilians in the field and 
hundreds of staff at headquarters in New York, it was not realistic to hang on to the ways 
of the past. Rather than relying on the genius of a few exceptionally talented pioneers to 
hold things together against the weight of a dysfunctional bureaucracy, the organization 
had to become sufficiently professional to allow the average qualified staff member to do a 
decent job within the system. 
In Guéhenno’s analysis, peacekeeping also provided better opportunities for reform than 
any other part of the UN system. The structure of the peace operations system as a whole 
provided for a potentially large supporting coalition of financial contributors (who want their 
money to be used efficiently and effectively), troop and police contributors (who want their 
people to be safe and making a positive difference that reflects well on themselves) and 
the recipient countries, mostly in Africa (the largest regional voting bloc, whose members 
want the increased stability peacekeeping can bring). Rather than “implementing the low-
est common denominator,” it should be the ambition of the international civil service to use 
these opportunities and strive “to increase the scope of agreement among states in the 
service of the greater good.”36
Guéhenno joined peacekeeping at an opportune time, with the “Brahimi Bonanza” in full 
swing as his deputy, Hédi Annabi, put it later. The Brahimi Report, strongly supported by 
the Security Council and accepted by the General Assembly, provided positive momentum 
both on the internal, cultural front – were everybody understood the huge political and 
budgetary opportunity in front of them – and on the external front of member states. The 
report made a formidable set of demands to member states and the bureaucracy alike. 
                                                  
35  This section is based on extensive interviews with and some written accounts by most of the protagonists, conducted 
or collected between 2006 and 2009. 
36  Interview with Jean-Marie Guéhenno, April 2009. 
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Governments were asked to choose carefully when and where to employ a peacekeeping 
operation and to provide support commensurate with its mandate. At the same time, the 
Secretariat had to become more effective in managing the missions – among other things, 
by establishing an effective learning infrastructure. The key parts of this infrastructure, as 
sketched out in the Brahimi Report, would be a “revitalized” Lessons Learned Unit, new 
knowledge management systems and the promotion of a learning culture within the organ-
ization. 
Other than tossing out these crucial elements of a future learning infrastructure, however, 
the report did not provide a strategy for actually building it. The hard task of formulating 
and implementing such a strategy lay still ahead, and proceeded only slowly. There were 
three closely related reasons for this delay. First, the myriad demands of day-to-day mis-
sion management necessarily took precedence over Guéhenno’s time and the resources 
of his overextended department. Second, the same logic of precedence applied to organi-
zational capacity-building and reform. The units providing direct operational control and 
support were the first recipients of managerial attention, increased funding and new talent, 
while the “rear” parts of the organization had to wait their turn. Finally, the staffing needs of 
field operations, drawn-out budget negotiations and the cumbersome recruitment system 
of the UN Secretariat greatly slowed down the speed at which Guéhenno could hire more 
of the young managers with field experience who supported his reform agenda. One of the 
first of these was Salman Ahmed, the co-author of both the Srebrenica and Brahimi re-
ports, who became Guéhenno’s Special Assistant and a key figure in the implementation 
of reform. 
As a result, it took more than two years until the reformers got around to a thorough analy-
sis of the department’s existing learning infrastructure. When they did turn their attention to 
this problem, they began with asking what was hindering the existing Policy Analysis and 
Lessons Learned Unit from acting as an effective driver gathering lessons from the field to 
feed into doctrine development, training and implementation on the ground, with a swift 
feedback mechanism to enable the constant improvement of doctrine and training. They 
found that most of the modest growth in the unit’s capacity since 1995 had been absorbed 
by servicing the intergovernmental committees, such as the General Assembly’s Special 
Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. In as much as it had been able to work on its 
actual mandate, the unit had followed a reactive approach. Based on available capacity, 
members conducted or commissioned “lessons-learned studies” of mostly closing missions 
in order to capture best practices. However, the intended recipients – senior managers and 
mission planners in the Office of Operations – rarely found the resulting reports sufficiently 
timely and relevant to be useful for their work. With a maximum output of two lessons 
learned studies or Secretary-General’s reports per year between 1997 and 2000, the Les-
sons Learned Unit was largely unable to make itself relevant with regard to the key chal-
lenges faced by operational managers at the time. In the words of an official report issued 
much later, its output in terms of useful guidance materials had been “limited, their quality 
uneven and their status often ambiguous, especially with regard to expectations of compli-
ance.”37
At this point, officials in the field rarely saw the fruit of these efforts on the parts of their 
headquarters in New York. To some extent, learning happened in individual missions, but if 
a lesson was ever transferred from one mission to another, or taken from a “sister mission” 
run by another international organization, it was largely by accident. The division of authori-
ty between constabulary police and military forces is a crucial case in point. In response to 
an incident of civil unrest on October 1, 1998 on a major overland road near Capljina in 
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Bosnia, the senior NATO officer on site ordered an Italian carabinieri unit against the ob-
jections of its commander to forcibly remove a group of protesters. While the military officer 
acted in accordance with the chain of command, the resulting escalation of violence 
caused a number of casualties among civilians and police officers alike and damaged both 
the effectiveness and legitimacy of NATO’s Stabilization Force (SFOR) (Perito 2004: 162–
4). Subsequently, SFOR command developed the so-called Blue Box doctrine that speci-
fied command and control arrangements in joint military and police operations. In case of 
civil unrest, an Area of Responsibility (AoR) for police action would be established in a par-
ticular territory and for a defined period of time. Within this ‘blue box,’ the senior constabu-
lary police officer would have authority not only over his own units but also over all military 
forces present, allowing the police to employ their nonviolent tactics to greater effective-
ness. On the outside, the military would retain command and control. For NATO forces in 
Bosnia, the new doctrine worked well in a series of further incidents. 
In Kosovo, the parallel setup of constabulary units within the UN Mission in Kosovo (UN-
MIK) Police and NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR) with different and overlapping mandates 
led to a series of clashes over respective authority and roles, as well. The lack of a doc-
trine on joint operations was felt at various points, including the mishandling of the 2000 
Mitrovica riots and the subsequent reluctance of military commanders to use the largely 
non-Western UN constabulary units for mistrust of their attention to human rights when 
required to use force against civilians. As a reaction to these experiences with civil unrest 
in 2000, UNMIK and KFOR quickly developed a local command and control doctrine that 
included setting up a Joint Operations Center and Regional Operations Centers to coordi-
nate the respective day-to-day activities as well as flexible command arrangements based 
on the level of tension in each area.38 Still, it took the persistent leadership of two succes-
sive police commissioners over three years until the agreed principles of pragmatic coop-
eration were put into practice in a regular manner.39
None of these local learning processes in the field were even so much as formally recog-
nized at headquarters during that time. In New York, reformers were still busy putting the 
groundwork into place. As a first step toward a more comprehensive strategy, Guéhenno 
secured significant extra funding for the learning unit and put a staunch proponent of or-
ganizational reform in charge: David Harland, Ahmed’s co-author in the Srebrenica investi-
gation. Harland was able to hire almost his entire team from scratch, a rare event in the UN 
bureaucracy that brought another wave of young, reform-oriented analysts to headquar-
ters. Most of the additional funds came from individual governments who wanted to sup-
port Secretariat capacity in this field, particularly the United Kingdom, Canada and Norway 
while a number of other European countries would pitch in on later occasions, including 
Germany.
With a new, expanded team, the number and analytical depth of the unit’s reports in-
creased significantly, and external consultants were hired to look into cross-cutting chal-
lenges such as coordination and mission integration. The long-running endeavor to create 
a Handbook on Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations was completed in 2003, and a 
new Knowledge Management Project was started to assemble an on-line Resource Center 
facilitating access to studies, reports and documents on peace operations by the UN and 
external sources. Harland’s willingness to open up to external expertise particularly in the 
scholarly community was part of a larger initiative driven from Secretary-General Annan’s 
office who successively retained high-profile academics such as Andrew Mack (1998-
2001) and Michael Doyle (2001-03) as Research Directors in his Executive Office. Over 
                                                  
38  Blume (2004: 97), Perito (2004: 187–234). 
39  Personal communication, former senior UN police official, September 2010. 
22
the following years, the Peacekeeping Best Practices Section (PBPS), once again re-
named, issued studies and reports at a record quality and pace, in addition to its internal 
duties toward the intergovernmental bodies.40
Nonetheless, these improvements in New York still had little impact on practice and the 
field beyond individual missions. Again, the example of police-military cooperation and the 
wider question of how constabulary police units (or “formed police units,” FPUs, in UN jar-
gon) were to be utilized and behave is instructive. What little guidance existed for the use 
of FPUs was mostly written by entrepreneurial officers in one particular field mission for its 
own use. The United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was the first in which headquar-
ters even defined the role of constabulary police in terms of actual tasks in its official mis-
sion plan, dated September 11, 2003: ‘law and order’ support to the local, UN-installed 
interim police force, dealing with civil disturbance in major population centers, capacity 
building for a future Liberian constabulary police force, and generally supporting the pro-
tection of civilians and property.41 UNMIL’s subsequent concept of operations, dated Janu-
ary 2004, for the first time included a comprehensive plan for the police component. Draft-
ed between the newly reinforced Civilian Police Division in New York and the very active 
UNMIL Police Commissioner Mark Kroeker in Monrovia, it was the first such concept that 
devotes several pages to the roles and capabilities of FPUs and their function within the 
overall mission. While hardly very specific, those few pages already pointed to a number of 
doctrinal challenges: when and what kind of force to use against violent protesters; internal 
discipline and respect for human rights in order to make a positive contribution to the popu-
lation’s sense of safety and security; and how to work together with the military, to name 
just a few. 
Seven months later, in August 2004, the concept of operations for the new United Nations 
Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) came out with an all but identical section on 
constabulary police forces.42 While these planning documents marked significant concep-
tual improvements over earlier ones, the substance of guidance for FPU contributors and 
mission leaders on the ground remained very limited. Beyond the envisaged roles and 
basic requirements for constabulary police units, almost no details were provided on the 
internal organization of FPUs, their rules of engagement, and their relationships to UN mili-
tary forces. Senior leaders on the ground were once again left to their own devices to fig-
ure out how to use constabulary police effectively, and headquarters had no formal stand-
ard to hold police-contributing countries accountable to specific levels of quality. In the 
field, the results varied widely and changed often abruptly with changes in senior police 
positions. What little improvements were made for the Liberia and Haiti missions were the 
result of individual initiative and an improved policy development capacity in the Police 
Division, not a learning process of the peace operations apparatus as a whole. 
At the central level, however, Harland soon recognized that the Best Practices unit re-
mained stuck in an ineffectual paradigm. Much as the authors of his lessons learned stud-
ies or some external consultant might learn about previous failures or best practices, writ-
ing a study provided no institutional learning benefit as long as planners in the Office of 
Operations and decision-makers in senior management saw no point in reading it or acting 
on its recommendations. Focusing the bulk of available resources on studying closing mis-
sions was particularly ineffective because it almost never produced results that were seen 
as applicable to current challenges, for two reasons. First, almost every contextual aspect 
of a closing mission would be different from the current ones, both externally (in terms of 
different political situations in the Security Council and in the mission area) and internally 
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(in terms of organizational changes within DPKO). Second, the single-case approach to 
writing those studies, without a guiding analytical framework and covering the whole range 
of possibly interesting questions about the mission, all but ensured that the product fol-
lowed perceived political priorities rather than providing candid analysis and drawing useful 
generalizations for application in different situations. As a result, there was no institutional 
follow-up on “lessons learned,” nor was there a standard operating procedure to collect the 
observations of serving officials in the field. 
After a year spent on hiring staff, managing external consultants and building up the Best 
Practices Section, Harland’s team began to reinvent the unit as a hub to support a com-
plete learning cycle. The problem was, however, that none of the other parts of that cycle – 
policy development, training, and evaluation – existed in DPKO. Apart from Security Coun-
cil mandates for individual missions and general administrative regulations, there were no 
policies to help peacekeepers implement their mandates, and there was effectively no 
training provided by the UN. The existing training unit was part of the Military Adviser’s 
office and already hard pressed to deliver orientation sessions and introductory seminars 
on cross-cutting topics such as human rights, gender equality and civil-military coordination 
at military academies and training centers around the world, given that almost 200,000 
troops rotated through UN peace operations every year. Only recently had the first four 
missions in the field created training centers to deliver a limited induction program to new 
staff, a high-level induction course for senior mission managers had been developed and 
the UN Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) had begun to build a program to sys-
tematically debrief SRSGs, funded by grants from member states and charitable founda-
tions. Evaluations were conducted on a case-by-case basis, mostly by former senior mili-
tary officers or senior mission leaders who would travel to a mission, conduct a few inter-
views and deliver a report. While often useful to assess the specific situation of the mission 
in question, these evaluations were not designed to ensure compliance with any kind of 
general policies or procedures, or to investigate the effectiveness of such doctrine. Clearly, 
the reformers concluded, a strategy was needed that went beyond the narrow confines of 
tweaking the inner workings of the Best Practices Unit. The peace operations bureaucracy 
needed full-scale transformation. 
24
5.  Peace Operations 2010: Putting Learning at the 
Center of Institutional Reform 
In the summer of 2005, an opportunity presented itself to get the ball rolling on the broader 
reform agenda. Guéhenno asked Harland to take over the job of Director of Change Man-
agement on an interim basis, while the previous incumbent went to serve in a senior man-
agement position in the field for a year. Harland quickly seized the opportunity to develop a 
broader reform agenda for DPKO based on what he called the “unfinished business” of the 
Brahimi Report, focusing on five core priorities: personnel (recruitment, training, rapid de-
ployment), doctrine (need for standards and guidance on key tasks, as well as a process 
for the constant adaptation of such guidance), organization (clear division of roles and re-
sponsibilities), resources (improving efficiency and harnessing more funds) and partner-
ships (with other UN and non-UN agencies). In each of these fields, he identified “weak-
nesses [that were] within the power of the Secretariat to change,” and drafted a five-year 
plan to do so. Guéhenno adopted this agenda for the department as a whole and present-
ed it to the diplomatic community in October 2005. Given a catchy title (“Peace Operations 
2010”), the program was further developed and distributed to peace operations personnel 
globally in November.43
Within the Peace Operations 2010 agenda, the work of establishing an effective infrastruc-
ture to support a full organizational learning cycle touched on almost every priority area, 
but was primarily associated with the priority of doctrine. This choice of language sparked 
instant opposition because many at the UN misunderstood the concept of doctrine as an 
exclusively military or militaristic term. It hardly helped that the term is often not consistent-
ly defined and employed outside military organizations, and until 2005, there was only an 
official UN definition for “military doctrine” as the “fundamental principles, practices and 
procedures that guide the military component of UN peacekeeping missions in support of 
mandated UN objectives.”44 However, doctrine in this sense as a set of principles and 
standard operating procedures to guide the actions of individuals on behalf of an organiza-
tion is no stranger to civilian bureaucracies as well. As Guéhenno explained in his letter to 
DPKO personnel, the aim was “to define and clearly articulate (…) what it is that UN 
peacekeeping can do and how, (…) followed by the development of effective guidance on 
how to achieve these standards. (…) We need uniform practices and procedures that … 
will be the basis for guiding you in carrying out your job. It will be a living doctrine that 
adapts to ongoing experiences and conditions.”45
In defining its strategy, Harland’s team conducted extensive research both internally and 
toward potential examples in other organizations. In 2004, the Best Practices Section had 
conducted a survey among field staff that revealed the extent to which people on the 
ground felt left alone by headquarters in New York. 50% of the almost 600 respondents 
complained that the lack of guidance and documentation required them to reinvent the 
wheel “very often” or “all the time.” 46% said they had received no guidance materials or 
orderly handover from a predecessor at the start of their current job, and only 28% had 
received “any kind of written instructions in the form of policies, manuals, best practices or 
otherwise.”46 The reformers concluded that they had a “knowledge-thirsty workforce,” but 
“weak institutional support” in terms of an easily accessible repository of doctrine and 
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guidance as well as effective knowledge management tools to support horizontal commu-
nication among different missions in the field.47 In trying to find the most effective ways to 
implement these ideas in an organization that was as fragile and decentralized as the 
peace operations bureaucracy, Harland’s team drew on a wide range of outside experi-
ences in some 20 other organizations, from international oil companies and the World 
Bank to the U.S. and Indian armies. 
Based on their findings, Harland’s team set up three parallel efforts to build the groundwork 
of a full learning cycle “that links the identification and sharing of best practices to the de-
velopment of policies, guidelines and procedures that reflect those lessons [in] an institu-
tional doctrine that can then be disseminated through training programmes”:48 (1) a Guid-
ance Project to establish a doctrine development process and some of the most needed 
guidance materials, (2) a “knowledge sharing toolbox” to enable better informal communi-
cation and feedback from the field, and (3) a revitalization of DPKO’s training efforts.  
While the Guidance Project was bound to be a top-down exercise to establish officially 
codified policies and procedures, the knowledge management team was tasked to develop 
ways of informal bottom-up and horizontal knowledge sharing, the products of which could 
be used as a source of feedback to inform the formulation and improvement of guidance 
for as long as it would take to establish an effective evaluation capacity as well.  
Figure 3: A UN reformers’ “ideal learning cycle”
Source: own figure, based on information from an interview with David Harland, 2007.
Harland’s guidance team developed a hierarchical architecture to organize the various 
pieces of doctrine at different levels of abstraction, to be filled by policy directives, standard 
operating procedures (SOPs), manuals and guidelines for the various functional areas of 
peace operations. At the top of the pyramid, the so-called Capstone Doctrine would “define 
the nature, scope and core business of contemporary UN peacekeeping operations (…). It 
identifies the comparative advantages and limitations of United Nations peacekeeping op-
erations as a conflict management tool, and explains the basic principles that should guide 
their planning and conduct.”49 All the progressively more fine-grained and technical ele-
ments of doctrine in each of the functional areas of peace operations link these abstract 
principles to the mission-specific planning and implementation in the field. At the begin-
ning, the guidance team would do all the legwork in terms of drafting policies and shep-
herding them through the approval process itself. As other units became willing to set 
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aside their own resources or obtain additional ones to take responsibility for policy devel-
opment in their subject area, the Best Practices Section would limit itself to the role of a 
“learning hub” supporting the various doctrine development and knowledge management 
processes and helping management to prioritize among them. To put each individual unit 
in charge of their own policies was seen as the only way to ensure their full participation in 
the process, and the only way to achieve a substantial level of output without putting unre-
alistic demands on the Best Practices Section alone. 
The knowledge sharing toolbox followed a much less predetermined approach. The idea 
was to provide a set of tools that would be equally useful for horizontal communication 
among field staff and for knowledge collection efforts at headquarters.50 The team urged 
senior officials to write End-of-Assignment Reports and conduct After Action Reviews to be 
shared on a new intranet platform, while officials at all levels were encouraged to write 
formal Handover Notes. Best Practices established on-line “communities of practice” for 
practitioners to discuss their challenges and solutions among each other, and offered to 
conduct “surveys of practice” on frequently asked questions among practitioners in the 
field, again sharing the results informally across the organization without prior review or 
approval by DPKO. All of these tools, no matter how well supported by the small team in 
New York, would impose additional work on often overworked and skeptical staffers in the 
field. Therefore, one “Best Practice Officer” would be deployed to every mission to support 
the adoption of these tools in practice. As the flow of information from the field would grow, 
it would also become increasingly useful as a source for prioritizing and informing guidance 
development at headquarters. 
In terms of training, DPKO’s scattered military and civilian training units were merged into a 
new Integrated Training Service (ITS). Previously being overstretched and ineffective by 
flying around the world to deliver lectures and seminars at the request of member states, 
the new ITS first sought to limit its own training activities to a select number of courses for 
senior mission leaders and civilian newcomers to peace operations, and otherwise focus 
on producing training materials for national and regional peacekeeping training centers. In 
a second step, following a change of leadership in October 2007, ITS went even further, 
primarily focusing on strategy, standard-setting and quality assurance, as well as conduct-
ing a very limited range of crosscutting training programs such as the civilian induction 
course and the senior leadership seminars.  
By way of example, it may be instructive to briefly examine two cases in which the newly 
improved systems for learning fared quite differently in that period. One of these examples 
is the integration of gender concerns into disarmament, demobilization and reintegration 
(DDR) programs in peace operations.51 In a pioneering interagency process that started in 
early 2004, formally established as the Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR (IAWG), 
DPKO and UNDP steered the entire UN system to jointly develop high-level policy guid-
ance based on the experience of all the involved UN actors. The resulting 700-page strong 
Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS) represent 
one of the most ambitious and far-reaching guidance development processes within the 
entire UN peace operations system.52 A group of young, entrepreneurial UNIFEM officials 
saw an opportunity in this mammoth process to finally turn what they had found to be a 
series of ineffectual policy pronouncements on gender issues in peace operations into offi-
cial guidance, and therefore hopefully into practice. Drawing on a growing number of ex-
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pert studies and a growing chorus of advocacy, they saw the coincidental timing of the 
IDDRS initiative as a “window of opportunity to replace ad hoc measures and one-off pro-
jects with routine consideration of the different needs and capacities of women and men.”53
DPKO was very open to this UNIFEM initiative, which initially took the shape of a ground-
breaking report on women and DDR with specific reviews of best practice from the field. 
Under heavy pressure from women’s groups and select member states to take gender is-
sues more seriously, DPKO was actually “craving expertise on these issues and turning to 
UNIFEM for advice.” The UNIFEM report thus recommended that the Secretary General 
issue high-level policy guidance in order to “provide SRSGs and DPKO with optimal sam-
ple language for the negotiation of gender issues into DDR packages and processes.”54 In 
the field, practice in peace operations continued to lag behind. In late 2004, for example, 
experts argued that in Sierra Leone women and girls were sometimes the leaders of pro-
tests among ex-combatants against the delays that occurred in disbursing their reintegra-
tion benefits, protests that often erupted into violence and civil disorder. “Without support 
or care from their former ‘parents’ or ‘husbands’ [in the rebel group], their own families, the 
community, or the state, many of the young women – particularly those with children born 
as a result of their captivity – resorted to civil unrest as a means of accessing basic goods 
for the survival of their children. For these young women and girls, the stakes are, in effect, 
greater than for some of the men and boys.”55
In parallel to the working-level efforts between UNIFEM and DPKO, in October 2004 Euro-
pean member states initiated a Presidential Statement in the Security Council that re-
quested the Secretary-General to submit an action plan on the implementation of Resolu-
tion 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, passed on October 31, 2000, with negligible 
effect on actual DDR programs in the field. In doing so, the European Security Council 
members effectively created a mechanism for accountability at the highest level. In re-
sponse, an Inter-Agency Task Force on Women, Peace and Security prepared an encom-
passing Secretary-General’s report that was released in October 2005. This report 
acknowledged that information on gender aspects in progress reports on UN peace opera-
tions was sparse and did not allow for effective monitoring and evaluation of the UN’s gen-
der-related benchmarks and targets. In order to improve the UN’s performance in this field, 
the Secretary-General’s report announced that the broader IDDRS process would include 
a module on women and gender as well as for DPKO to create guidance on gender-
responsive DDR programming.56 The IDDRS working group on gender, driven by the same 
UNIFEM officials, then endorsed the provisions set out in their own earlier report, codifying 
the best practices put forward by UNIFEM and including them in this large-scale interagen-
cy guidance document.57 Reinforcing these specific provisions, only three months after the 
publication of the IDDRS, DPKO also issued a policy directive on gender equality in UN 
peace operations that also stressed the need to integrate gender perspectives in DDR 
programs.58
Despite the crucial relevance of political pressure on the part of the European states, the 
diplomatic level could not operationalize specific lessons into concrete guidance for use in 
the field. For this step, UNIFEM as the only actor within the UN system with a claim to sub-
stantive expertise was critical. Given the strong support by key member states, the wider 
gender movement had created such strong momentum in the Secretariat that other players 
in the IDDRS process did not oppose UNIFEM’s suggestions. The challenge of implemen-
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tation awaited, however: Officials involved in the guidance development process argue that 
with the IDDRS they had set out an extremely ambitious agenda that is “beautiful on paper, 
but extremely hard to implement at the field level.”59 In this case, however, there is evi-
dence that cautious optimism may be warranted. In Haiti, an official argued that even with 
the codification process still under way, “officials looked at gender aspects very carefully in 
program planning and conceived of dedicated projects for women associated with armed 
groups.”60 In Sudan, the existence of embedded gender officers was seen as “a critical 
success factor not only in terms of having the right expertise on hand but also in terms of 
ensuring there is accountability on gender mainstreaming within the unit.”61
Another instructive example with less encouraging results is the case of building justice 
institutions, a mandated task in a number of state-building missions from Kosovo and Ti-
mor-Leste to African countries and beyond. Practitioners in UN peace operations and out-
side critics increasingly identified an “exclusively technical focus on assistance and training 
as well as a largely apolitical approach to building institutions” as a key challenge for sus-
tainable peacebuilding in various countries.62 After years of ineffectual advocacy for les-
sons from the field, the resource base for judicial reform policy in DPKO was temporarily 
increased in 2005, when the United Kingdom agreed to fund a comprehensive lessons 
learned study. Released in early 2006, the study advanced the argument in favor of taking 
institution-building serious as a political rather than a technical challenge, and going be-
yond training to operationalize it.63 As a result of the study, DPKO released a “primer” for 
judicial field personnel that echoed the new focus on the political dimension: “Rule of law 
work is often more political than it is technical. Thus, the importance of incorporating rule of 
law concerns into the analysis of the conflict, political strategy development and political 
dialogue cannot be overstated. (...) If rule of law issues are not on the table of the interna-
tional and national policy-makers, technical programmes and interventions will likely have 
minimal effect.”64
Officials in charge of planning and supporting judicial programs in the field were conscious 
of the fact that issuing nonbinding guidance documents for field personnel would not be 
sufficient to change the organization’s practice and to assure the required leadership sup-
port. With UN-wide action on judicial issues still inefficient and mired in turf fights, they 
convinced the Secretary-General to propose the creation of a high-level coordination 
mechanism on the rule of law within the UN family of organizations to lobby and press for 
more concerted action across the board.65 The first priority of its secretariat was to clarify 
the organization’s strategic approach in an authoritative way by developing an overarching 
guidance note on rule of law assistance, to be issued by the Secretary-General. After be-
ing cleared by the senior management in early 2008, the new approach officially made ‘the 
political context’ one of the primary guiding principles for UN rule of law action. In particu-
lar, the note reinforced that “rule of law assistance has often overemphasized technical 
questions and paid less attention to political and strategic considerations (…). Senior UN 
representatives in the field need to understand the political nature of strengthening the rule 
of law, and dedicate attention to supporting both the political and institutional aspects of 
rule of law development. In cooperation with Headquarters and in partnership with the na-
tional political leadership and other stakeholders, UN leadership at the field level is re-
sponsible for fostering political space for reform and insulating the rule of law from inap-
                                                  
59  Interview, UNMIS official, November 2009. 
60  Interview, MINUSTAH official, November 2009. 
61  Interview, UNMIS official, November 2009. 
62  Benner, Mergenthaler and Rotmann (2011: 128). The following is a very brief summary of a more comprehensive 
case study which can be found in full in Benner, Mergenthaler and Rotmann (2011: 126-135). 
63  Carlson (2006). 
64  UN DPKO (2006a: 9). 
65  UN Secretary-General (2006). 
 29
propriate political influence or abuse.”66 In essence, the guidance note unambiguously 
acknowledged that the UN’s assistance to often inherently flawed rule of law institutions in 
post-conflict countries will be ineffective if it is not underpinned by a concerted political en-
gagement and strategy. 
Promulgating policy guidelines, however, is not enough to complete the learning cycle. The 
new guidelines need to be implemented and, for a piece of doctrine at very high level of 
abstraction such as this note, complemented by concrete practical guidance to assist op-
erational work in the field. The implementation also needs to be tracked and evaluated. In 
this case, it is precisely the implementation of the newly adopted policy that has proven the 
toughest challenge to learning. On the one hand, this is linked to the weakness of formal 
structures to support the full chain of the learning cycle. The learning infrastructure remains 
insufficiently developed: enough for guidance development, but not for the full chain of the 
learning cycle including training and evaluation. The limited resources and institutional ca-
pacity of the Judicial Unit at DPKO slowed down its capacity to actually translate these 
new polices into effective training programs. On the other hand, this example also points to 
the fact that leadership is often a critical element for ensuring the full implementation of 
significant policy shifts. As key UN officials acknowledge, regardless of the guidance de-
velopment process, some political actors in the Security Council as well as senior leaders 
on the ground continue to “see judicial reform as purely technical or readily buy arguments 
of [national] sovereignty” (being violated by political “meddling” in justice systems). In some 
cases, the mission leadership might have clear reasons for not exerting too much pressure 
on different factions of the host government on judicial reform. They might need the gov-
ernment’s cooperation on other fronts and might not want to jeopardize political capital by 
focusing on judicial reform. At the very least, however, they would need to justify their 
choice of priorities to headquarters and the Security Council, which is currently not re-
quired of them. Because it is often a difficult and frustrating undertaking in the field to press 
the host government on judicial matters, without unambiguous leadership from headquar-
ters or even the Security Council in support of the political approach to justice reform little 
progress could be expected toward the effective implementation of the adopted policy. 
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6.  Conclusion: The Challenges of Implementation 
Despite Guéhenno’s personal endorsement and support, the reinvigorated reform program 
quickly encountered resistance within the department. The most skeptical officials were to 
be found in the higher echelons of DPKO and in its core element, the Office of Operations. 
Organized in regional divisions and desks for each field operation, the Office of Operations 
coordinates the political planning, deployment and ongoing management of peace opera-
tions, drawing on the services and expertise of the rest of the department as required. As a 
result, the office enjoys enormous informal authority and regards itself as the best and 
most hard-working part of the organization. Justifiably proud of having held together many 
a mission in crisis with little more than their bare hands and starved for resources for a 
long time, Operations managers were the main carriers of the department’s traditional cul-
ture of ad-hoc improvisation.67 At the same time, mutually destructive stereotypes poisoned 
the atmosphere among the different parts of DPKO, and the Operations crowd found 
themselves widely accused of arrogance and aloofness in dealing with the nuts-and-bolts 
parts of their own department. 
When it came to organizational learning, many Operations officials had seen scores of 
“lessons learned reports” that they ultimately found irrelevant for their day-to-day business. 
Given their rapidly rising workload throughout 2005 and 2006, it was hardly surprising that 
many found themselves not only unable to contribute to knowledge management systems 
or doctrine development, but that some went as far as to question the wisdom of spending 
scarce resources on another exercise that was asking for their time and attention now 
while promising a payoff much later, if at all. More to the point, some officials feared that 
the drive toward professionalization and standard operating procedures would result in a 
technocratic, “cookie-cutter” approach to peace operations that would level contextual dif-
ferences and marginalize local knowledge even further. In making this argument, they 
echoed well-founded warnings in part of the academic literature. As Michael Barnett ar-
gues, “[it] is [the] lack of knowledge [on the part of peace operations staff] about how to 
engineer a successful postconflict operation that poses the real problem. At present, many 
peacebuilders escape their uncertainty by relying on general models that frequently are 
developed from their most recent experiences in the field.” Like development economists in 
the 1970s, the danger is that peace operations professionals would be “falling in love with 
their models and assuming that these countries were so simple that those models told 
them all they needed to know.” Instead of universal templates, Barnett argues that suc-
cessful peace operations “require judgment informed by a deep knowledge of local circum-
stances and views.”68
While undoubtedly well founded and in most cases brought forward without ulterior mo-
tives, it is somewhat ironic that allegations of bureaucratic universalism were raised in re-
sponse to the efforts of “a new generation of UN staff [who] (…) are self-critical and skepti-
cal of cookie-cutter approaches” themselves.69 Unavoidably, some of these issues were 
also fueled by the underlying cultural rift between this younger generation of reformers and 
the longer-serving, generally older generation of traditionalists. In the evolution of organiza-
tional culture, the balance began to tip in about 2005. The new posts that the Brahimi re-
forms had yielded for DPKO had been filled mainly with reform-minded officials from the 
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field for whom the Brahimi Report embodied the guiding paradigm. In addition, Guéhenno’s 
professionalization efforts bore fruit. A 2004 management review conducted by the UN’s 
internal auditors recognized “a number of worthy initiatives in that area [management cul-
ture] that were focused on change from crisis-driven decision-making to tackling longer-
term systemic issues and from being reactive to becoming more responsive to the needs 
of the field.”70
Building on this sense of movement on the cultural level, the proponents of the learning 
agenda managed to convince a sufficiently strong coalition of supporters at all levels of the 
necessity and the merits of the proposed changes. Over a period of several months and 
with “top cover” from Guéhenno, they set up a working group to drive the reform process 
and established a formal doctrine development procedure both of which were sufficiently 
inclusive to draw on the substantial expertise of supporters and skeptics alike, and to allow 
the latter a significant say, often effectively a veto, on policy decisions.71
When Jean-Marie Guéhenno left office in the summer of 2008, the internal political and 
cultural support for his reforms had become itself a part of the organization’s identity. While 
each of the building blocs for an effective infrastructure of learning – and ultimately, to 
make the peace operations bureaucracy a “learning organization”72 – remained unfinished 
business, there was no backlash from within the bureaucracy after his departure: despite 
the odds, the reformers had achieved Guéhenno’s initial goal to “build an institution” and 
even long-time skeptics among DPKO’s senior management praised him for “transforming 
Best Practices into something really useful.”73
In his final months in office, Guéhenno implemented the new Secretary-General Ban Ki-
moon’s plan to divide the core of the peace operations bureaucracy into a policy and man-
agement department (which retained the name DPKO) and a new Department of Field 
Support (DFS) to cover administration and logistics. On the coattails of that separation and 
a substantial if insufficient budget increase, the Secretariat convinced member states to 
fund a number of policy development positions in various parts of DPKO, create a stronger 
Policy, Evaluation and Training Division, and combine the Police Division, a small judicial 
section, the disarmament team and a small new team on security sector reform into a new 
high-level Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (Figure 4).  
                                                  
70  UN Secretary-General (2004a: 17). 
71  The doctrine development process is formally defined in an SOP dated July 2005, see UN DPKO (2005). 
72  UN Secretary-General (2007: 4). 
73  Interview, long-standing senior DPKO official, 2009. 
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Figure 4: Inside the Peace Operations Bureaucracy
Source: own figure, based on several official UN organizational charts.
Eight years after the Brahimi Report and six decades after the first peacekeeping mission, 
it was the first time that the peace operations bureaucracy possessed a learning infrastruc-
ture sufficiently well resourced and integrated into decision-making processes to support a 
basic hum of modestly ambitious activity to take place. Until that time, most learning pro-
cesses had been more of a fight against bureaucracy than a process supported by it. 
A preliminary assessment by the Secretariat after the first two years (2005-2007) lists the 
general outputs of the new learning infrastructure. Over that time period, the knowledge 
sharing toolbox generated “78 After Action Reviews, 129 End of Assignment Reports and 
eight Surveys of Practice” while the policy development system resulted in “24 policy direc-
tives, eight guidelines, 14 standard operating procedures and four manuals … on a wide 
range of operational tasks.”74 Best Practice Officers were deployed to most multidimen-
sional missions. Use of the new intranet platform and participation in horizontal exchanges 
through Communities of Practice has grown rapidly, with ten communities with a total of 
almost 1,500 contributors active and more requests for the establishment of new ones than 
the small knowledge sharing team could handle (ibid.). In addition, the new Principles and 
Guidelines document issued in February 2008 is the first high-level statement of peace 
operations doctrine in more than a decade.75
Beyond these rather superficial output counts, we need a more thorough understanding of 
the outcomes and impact of the attempted transformation toward a learning organization. 
The twelve case studies of learning reviewed in our recently published book are a first cut 
                                                  
74  UN Secretary-General (2007: 9). 
75  UN DPKO/DFS (2008). 
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at getting a more nuanced understanding of the interplay of political and institutional fac-
tors in concrete learning processes.76
One of the findings is that while political factors trump institutional factors in terms of influ-
encing learning, only institutional factors are scalable through the kind of reform efforts 
detailed in this paper. Another is that support of key member states is important as is the 
leadership provided by key players inside the bureaucracy for these reform efforts to have 
a chance to succeed. These two robust findings point to our twin policy conclusions at the 
most general level: 
1. Financially, member states and senior UN officials need to recognize and promote 
learning, doctrine development, training and evaluation as “force multipliers” for 
the effectiveness of peace operations and support smart investments in these ar-
eas. In many cases, it has been much easier to get huge numbers of posts funded 
for police and civilian experts when a new field mission has been established while 
even a handful of positions with a strategic benefit to the effectiveness of the en-
tire organization have had to rely on external donor funding. As a result, new posts 
in missions go unfilled for months on end, and in an environment of overstretch 
many are ultimately filled with newly hired staff with little experience for whom the 
systems of training and guidance are not in place, because those resources are 
not funded to a sufficient extent. This dysfunctional dynamic must change: mis-
sions can be planned with more realistic numbers of actual experts for key civilian 
functions, reducing the budgetary as well as the administrative burden on UN hu-
man resources systems. 
2. Politically, member states need to continue to invest the attention and political 
capital in New York to champion or even spark worthwhile initiatives at the strate-
gic and operational level, without succumbing to the occasional temptation to mi-
cromanage the Secretariat. Several of the case studies in our book have shown 
that positive political influence can be a critical success factor for learning if an ef-
fective organizational infrastructure is in place. 
In pursuing both of these recommendations in parallel, member states, in particular, are 
most likely to be successful in supporting progress on the issues that are most important to 
them. In the past five years, the UN peace operations apparatus has been “learning to 
learn” as directed by the “Peace Operations 2010” reform agenda, with the doctrine devel-
opment and knowledge management elements being largely implemented while the train-
ing and evaluation parts remain underdeveloped. What is needed now is an overall evalua-
tion of how the “learning infrastructure” fared in practice and what adjustments are needed 
(also in terms of the interplay with similar efforts in other parts of the UN system). A chang-
ing of the guard at the working level has taken place and a new generation has taken the 
institutional development agenda forward, as shown by recent initiatives such as Under-
Secretary-General Alain Le Roy’s New Horizons process and the Civilian Capacity Re-
view.77 At the same time, progress toward further professionalization and short-term effec-
tiveness must not be allowed to stand alone; there remains a need to invest in the critical 
and sometimes politically painful aspects of learning (such as self-critical evaluation mech-
anisms) while maintaining an acute awareness of the potential and limits of the business of 
peace operations.
                                                  
76  Benner, Mergenthaler and Rotmann (2011). 
77  UN DPKO (2009), UN Secretary-General (2011). 
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Annex:  Interviews 
The research at the core of this study draws on a wealth of often confidential documents 
from inside the United Nations, including draft and released versions of guidance materials 
such as handbooks and standard operating procedures. Even more important were the 
interviews conducted personally and via telephone between 2006 and 2010 with key pro-
tagonists in the case studies and the broader evolution of the learning capacity in the UN 
peace operations bureaucracy. Overall, we had more than 250 interviews with mostly cur-
rent and former UN officials but also experts on peace operations and officials interacting 
with the UN or its peace operations at headquarters and in the field, including diplomats, 
aid workers, development specialists, academics and journalists. Most of these interlocu-
tors were very candid and outspoken, and many asked to remain anonymous. The follow-
ing provides a breakdown by function and seniority that may illustrate the distribution of 
sources (to some of whom we spoke repeatedly over the years): 
? 46 serving DPKO officials at headquarters, covering all parts of the department 
and all ranks. 
? 26 serving officials of all ranks at other headquarters departments, agencies and 
programs (Executive Office of the Secretary-General, Dept. of Political Affairs, 
UNDP and DGO/DOCO, Peacebuilding Support Office, OCHA) 
? 65 serving officials in field missions, mainly UNMIL (Liberia), UNMIT (Timor-Leste) 
and MINUSTAH (Haiti), including from other UN departments and agencies. 
? 27 serving officials in other governmental or international organizations, including 
embassies of Canada, China, Germany, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, 
the U.K, and the U.S., and development agencies, working with UN peace opera-
tions in New York or in the field. 
? 31 experts at universities, think tanks and similar institutions working on learning, 
on the UN or the particular case studies and field operations we worked on. 
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